The recent Financial Crisis and Great Recession has generated renewed interest in the Great Depression and particularly the New Deal, as people seek answers about the sources of recovery from a serious downturn. Studies of Depression-era labor markets have focused heavily on downward stickiness of wages because unemployment rose above 20 percent for four years and total hours of employment dropped more and recovered less than the number employed (Bernanke 1983; Cole and Ohanian 1999) . High wages are often cited as causing the drops in employment and hours, but it is important to recognize that weekly hours and wages are part of an overall employment package simultaneously set in labor markets. Benjamin Bernanke (1983) recognized this in the analysis that underlay his seminal study of monthly data on employment, hours, and earnings in manufacturing during the Great Depression and in work with Powell (1986) on the post-war era until the early 1980s.
During both the Great Depression and the Great Recession total hours worked dropped dramatically and then remained well below long term trends during the recovery. However, the contributions to changes in total hours of changes in the length of the workweek varied dramatically between the two time periods and over the course of the century. The Median Weekly Hours Share (WHS) in Table 1 uses monthly data from establishment surveys of hours and employment to show the percentage that changes in hours worked per week contributed to changes in total hours worked per week over three-month periods. For each decade, the WHS is calculated for all periods and during periods when total hours rose and periods when they fell.
The results show striking changes across the decades. During the 1930s the WHS shows that changes in weekly hours accounted for around half of all changes in total hours worked during Effective analysis of the differences in the role of weekly hours across time periods requires a deep understanding of the labor market institutions and government policies across eras. Our focus is on the 1930s, when the unusual pattern for the WHS for the 1930s was driven in part by a series of emergency policies followed by the federal government in response to moribund labor markets. Some of the patterns in the late 1930s were created by the introduction of long run policies that established the basis for labor market institutions in later eras. Most recent work on the 1930s has focused on high-wage policies coming through jawboning by President Herbert Hoover in the early 1930s, code negotiations under the National Recovery Administration (NRA), and strengthened unionization under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 2 We emphasize that high wages were only one part of a policy package that tightly interwove them with reductions in weekly hours and increases in employment. None of these pieces can be treated as isolated from and/or exogenous to the others. Further, we place strong emphasis on several key changes in the policy environment that have been largely glossed over in most prior studies, including the President's Reemployment Agreements beginning in August 1933, and the very weak enforcement of the NLRA until the Supreme Court found it
constitutional in April 1937. These key policy changes are associated with quite striking changes in weekly hours, employment, and hourly earnings.
I. Changes in the WHS for Manufacturing Over the Last 90 Years
The role played by changes in weekly hours in changes in total labor inputs has typically been shown by comparing the variances of total hours, weekly hours, and total employment using a time series filter to clear out seasonal fluctuation and long run trends. We chose the WHS approach without seasonal or cyclical adjustment because we wanted to show the data as the policy makers were seeing it, particularly in the 1930s. Further, we wanted to show changes over time in the asymmetry in the WHS during upswings and downswings in hours. Responses to seasonality are unlikely to be the source of the differences in Table 1 because when we calculated the WHS with 12-month changes, the comparisons were similar in magnitude.
The size of the contribution of changes in weekly hours to changes in total labor input was starkly different during the 1930s and the 2000s when compared with other decades. Bernanke and Powell (1986) had noted differences in the behavior of weekly hours between the 1923-1940 and the 1950-1982 periods. The patterns of the WHS in Table 1 also show differences between the two periods as well as some additional variation within the interwar period. During upswings, the WHS in Table 1 shows that the typical contribution of rising weekly hours to the rise in total hours rose from 32 percent in the 1920s to 45 percent of the increases during the 1930s and then fell back to 27 percent in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 1920s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s , adjustments in weekly hours played a much smaller role. Bernanke and Powell (1986, 594-5) Given that unions were weak and that there was no unemployment insurance in the 1920s, greater unionization and access to unemployment insurance can only partially explain the interwar and post-war differences. A careful look at the policy moves and the harshness of the Great Depression is needed in order to explain the unusual behavior of WHS during f the 1930s.
The WHS measure also reveals a striking change in the role played by hours after 1980 that has led analysts to talk of jobless recoveries and heavy reliance on layoffs. 3 Increasing talk of jobless recoveries has been driven by rises in the WHS during upswings in hours worked. The share of increases in total hours due to increases in weekly hours has risen sharply each decade from 23 percent in the 1970s to the Depression Era level of 46 percent in the 1990s to a very high 64 percent in the 2000s. Meanwhile, employers appear to have been relying increasingly on Table 2 dropped sharply and stayed below 41 for the remainder of the 1930s. Given the cyclicality of weekly hours, there is no doubt that a significant share of the changes in weekly hours during the 1930s were driven by the size of the Depression. Import the WHS ratio from the 1920s into the 1930s and roughly one-third of the upswings and down-swings in total hours might have been explained by cyclical conditions. Yet, the WHS for the 1930s shows that the actual contribution of changes in weekly hours to the ups and downs in total hours worked was roughly 50 percent.
As shown in Table 2 , there were significant changes in the contributions of changes in weekly hours during periods defined by various policy regimes during the 1930s. The WHS in Table 2 is calculated with disaggregated data for 11 manufacturing sectors, so that each observation used to calculate the median is an industry-month. The disaggregated WHSs for the 1920s in Table 2 are very similar to the aggregated WHSs for the 1920s in Table 1 . Many but not all of the 11 industries follow similar paths over the period.
II.a. The Hoover Years
A share of the differences between the 1930s and other decades can be attributed to the various work-sharing policy regimes pressed by the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, and even some major industrialists, to help workers survive in an economic emergency. In his memoirs, Hoover (1953, 54-57) stated that the labor policies he proposed to industrialists in the early 1930s called for employers to look after the relief of their own workers, maintain employment by work-sharing with weekly hours cuts, and insure that each worker's weekly purchasing power was not cut too drastically by maintaining hourly wages or allowing them to decline only with the cost-of-living. He referred to these work-sharing policies as a type of "indirect relief" for unemployment-contrasting it with "direct relief" whereby funds are provided by some charitable or government action.
The Roosevelt administration followed suit with its policies toward industry and work relief. The President's Reemployment Agreements (PRA) and the NRA codes were explicitly designed with these goals in mind. Meanwhile, work relief under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) from 1933 to 1935 was explicitly designed to limit hours of work for recipients so that relief could be provided to more families to reach a minimum consumption standard. In some cities where FERA budgets were overwhelmed, hours and benefits were cut so that more families could at least some help. Under the Works Progress Administration work relief, monthly hours were also limited so that more families would benefit. Unions also pressed for work-sharing by cutting weekly hours but they tried to add a requirement that weekly wages not be cut, a policy that no one else supported. Figure 1 ).
Meanwhile, the WHS, as shown in Table 2 , rose dramatically relative to the 1920s. During percent of the nation's employers had adopted some form of work-sharing and that one quarter of those Americans employed owed their situation to this policy (Bernstein, 1969, 479 we are now doing with work, because there is a partial famine in work" (Weinberg and Weinberg, 1968, p. 247) . 4 Another may have been fears that if they did not follow suit, the Hoover administration might shift federal policy in favor of collective bargaining. During the World War I emergency the federal government had actively promoted collective bargaining over the protests of many industries. After the federal government withdrew its control of large parts of the economy, labor strife followed as employers and workers sought to work out the new rules of bargaining.
The end result was that union membership and strike activity waned and the figures in the early 1930s matched post-war lows. Given the nadir of unionization at that time, it does not seem likely that employers feared strikes or unions much. However, the employers might well have feared that an irritated Hoover and Congress would respond to the Depression emergency with new federal labor policy. Hoover (1953, 54-57) 
II.b. Union Pressure for Reduced Hours During the Interregnum
After Roosevelt's electoral victory in November 1932, labor unions, who had long pushed for shorter workweeks in the US, saw an opening to accomplish not just Hoover's push for firms' "voluntary compliance" in shortening the workweek, but legislative action. During the AFL's annual convention, three weeks after the election, President William Green proposed a six 
II.c. The President's Reemployment Agreements
To speed the labor provisions of the act into effect, Roosevelt created the President's Reemployment Agreement (PRA) which began on August 1, 1933. Roosevelt pressed firms to expand employment under the act and asked them to sign a "blanket" agreement to pay minimum hourly wages of 40 cents per hour, raise wages for higher paid workers, cap the workweek at 35 hours, and allow workers to bargain collectively. Roosevelt provided incentives for the firms to sign the agreements through a massive public relations campaign. happened to the WHS. In contrast to all other periods we have measured, the WHS was negative for industries that were expanding work hours during this five-month span. Weekly hours actually fell when total hours worked were rising, working against the expansion of total hours by a negative 23 percent. In the periods when industries expanded total hours in the PRA time frame, the drop in weekly hours accounted for 89 percent of the expansion in total hours.
The PRAs were the classic example of a package of high wages, job-sharing, and maintenance of employment. Even though they were voluntary, they received much more of a boost than the job-sharing, high wage jawboning by Hoover because of the massive public relations campaign launched by the Roosevelt administration. Further, the PRAs were signed by many nonmanufacturing firms and the changes seen in manufacturing were also seen in mining, trade, and nearly every sector except utilities (see Figures in Appendix II). Prior to that time only bond sales had received such promotion during the World War I emergency (Taylor 2011) .
II.d. The NRA Codes and the NLRA Before the Court Declared It Constitutional
The NRA codes were negotiated between employers, workers, and consumers, but the employers typically held the upper hand. Figure 1 for manufacturing industries shows that during the NRA period, hourly earnings rose slightly, while weekly hours were centered around a 35-36 hour level with fluctuations around that level that help drive similar fluctuations in total hours. During that time, the WSH in Table 2 shows that roughly 40 percent of the swings in total hours were contributed by swings in weekly hour in both upswings and downswings. The median WSH's were only slightly higher than those seen in the 1920s. (Rosenbloom 2005, 336-7, 354-5) .
In either case the effect of the elimination of the NRA and the introduction of the NLRA are not readily detectible in the labor market data in Figure 1 and Table 2 . During a phase of strong recovery in industrial production, weekly hours, total hours worked, and hourly earnings all follow relatively smooth paths with a slightly positive trend from May 1935 through March 1937. The WHS measures in Table 2 are roughly the same for the NRA and NLRA period before constitutionality was affirmed. The WHS in both periods differed drastically from the WHS in the PRA period and still remained somewhat higher than they had in the 1920s.
II.e. A Constitutional National Labor Relations Act
The changes were far more dramatic when the NLRA was affirmed by the Supreme
Court on April 12, 1937 in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation, 301 U.S. 1. The effect on strike and union activity was immediate. The number of workers in union recognition strikes nearly quadrupled, from 202,118 and 272,013 in 1935 and 1936 to 941,802 in 1937. 5 Likewise, annual data on union membership support the notion that 1937 was a key turning point. Estimates from Freeman (1998, p. 289) show that union membership spiked from 3.85 million in 1936 to 6.76 million and 7.76 million respectively in 1937 and 1938. 6 Additionally these two years saw a surge in sit-down strikes, before the National Labor Relations Board and courts ruled them to be illegal.
Drops in total hours in Figure 1 started immediately. Some of the drop was likely due to the sudden surge in strike activity, however it is important to note that weekly hours dropped as well. Both series began falling before the sharp drop in industrial production associated with the 1937-1938 recession. Real hourly earnings in Figure 1 had begun to surge a few months before the decision, but surged even more rapidly after the decision. They soon leveled off later in the year, despite sharp drops in output, employment, and hours. The one area where the NLRA decision does not seem to have affected things much was in the WHS measures in Table 2 , which were very similar before and after the court decision. However, the average work week was still under 37 hours during the period, so the overtime cutoff likely did not have much effect until the end of 1940. Similarly, the minimum average wage was binding only in some industries in the South and Andrew Seltzer (1997) shows that those industries routinely found ways around the law. summarizes the experiences we have found for most manufacturing industries during the 1930s.
The PRA effects in manufacturing look similar for trade, and mining and miscellaneous categories, but are not there for utilities, which had different labor market institutions.
Furthermore, some sectors like mining and railroads were governed by policies specific to those sectors. Preliminary work shows that the size of the effects of the job sharing in the raw data still are present after controlling for cycles, seasonality, and policies directed at the money supply, deficit, and relief. Source: National Industrial Conference Board.
On-Line Appendix
Calculating the Weekly Hours Share Measure for a Time Period
To provide a sense of how changes in weekly hours contributed to changes in total hours worked during a week in different policy regimes during the 1930s in Table ? ?, we collected data from surveys of establishments from the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) in the 1920s and 1930s for 11 industries between 1920 and 1940. For comparisons across the decades in Table 1 we used the data aggregated for all manufacturing from the NICB from 1920 to 1940 and the data aggregated for all manufacturing collected from the establishment surveys by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1950 through 2011.
Total hours worked during the week in industry i in month t (H it ) is the product of average hours per week in industry i in month t weekly hours (h it ) and average employment in the week closest to the 15 th of month t in industry i (E it ).
H it = h it * E it .
The natural log of the equation is ln(H it ) = ln(h it ) + ln(E it ).
To smooth the data some for sharp changes that might have occurred due to unusual fluctuations, we calculate growth rates over a three month period can be calculated as ln(H it ) -ln(H it-3 ) = [ln(h it ) -ln(h it-3 )] + [ln(E it ) -ln(E it-3 )].
Note that this will lead to overlaps across periods. The share of the contribution of the log change in weekly hours to the log change in total hours, which we call Weekly Hours Share We used the medians so that highly unusual values did not dominate the measure.
We followed the same procedure for calculating the WHS during upswings and downswings in manufacturing for each decade in Table 1 except that we used the aggregate manufacturing observations rather than industry specific observations, which leads to the removal of the industry i subscript from all of the equations.
